Sunday, August 29, 2010

India's Weak Maritime Diplomacy

Prologue :

I had a challenge while working on this blog article. Because it is not technically an article or an essay in terms of conclusions, or way forward (at least to my satisfaction). It has a number of questions and open – loops that I have not been able to find answers. May be the readers in the right places, and institutions know it all..but not myself as a lay citizen. I sincerely hope to use social media to provoke interest, generate dialogue and if possible trigger search for authenticated & verifiable information, to fill in the various gaps. Hopefully that may pave way for creation of various think-tanks concerned with issues of national and social importance.

Main Article:

The sub-conscious elements of this article were around for sometime especially since the Mumbai terror attacks on November 26, 2008. I had watched the media blitzkrieg for more than 2 days, thinking, grimacing, angry and frustrated. Like any truly lazy Indian, the emotional energy generated during that tumultuous week fizzled out and some of it got internalized. It was a freak discovery of a Facebook comment regarding 'Pakistan Sea' a proposed new name for Arabian Sea – discussed in certain establishments of Pakistan – that led me to delve a bit deeper, into this whole renaming business, and other related matters which I would touch upon.

The deceptively innocuous term 'Pakistan Sea' cannot be jocularly dismissed as a figment of imagination, or a way of offsetting the negative publicity. This term emerging from within the senior power and thinking echelons in Pakistan, represents, that nation's valid aspirations to be a stronger naval power, be a maritime force to reckon with and to have an indelible stamp in the geo-politics of the Arabian Sea. And this desire has been further expressed by our neighbour's attempt to increase it's maritime influence, via a very legal way of extending the limits of it's Exclusive Economic Zone, and following a due process with United Nations. Pakistan was definitely within it's rights, and need to be praised for being able to extend it's maritime boundaries, for economic exploitation, and indirectly it's defence/ influence perimeter. As a good example, are their any lessons to be learned by India?

Territorial sea limit of 12 nautical miles (22.2 km) is claimed by both India and Pakistan. As a special case, based on unique geography, for India this 12-nautical-mile (22 km) limit includes Andaman, Nicobar and Lakshadweep. Like many other nations India and Pakistan have further a contiguous zone claim that extends to 24 nautical miles (44.4 km). The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) which is a seazone over which a state has special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources is upto 200 nautical miles (370 km) for both countries.

The extra extension of a country's Exclusive Economic Zone to the full 320 miles (from the coast) to cover the continental shelf has so far been granted to only 32 countries in the world that possess a continental shelf. This is governed by multi-lateral treaties, and the law of the sea, under the stewardship of United Nations special body : United Nations Commission on the Limit of Continental Shelf (UNCLOS). Countries were supposed to lodge their submissions to extend their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles within 10 years of UNCLOS coming into force in the country, or by 13 May 2009.

Our relatively smaller and, challenged on all fronts neighbor, Pakistan, filed a claim for extension in its continental shelf from 200 nautical miles to 350 nautical miles to UNCLOS on April 30, 2009.

‘No country has challenged our claim for an additional 150 nautical miles into the sea,’ said their then federal minister for Science and Technology, Azam Khan Swati, who had called a press briefing on 07 May 2009 to announce what he called an ‘historical conquest.’
The minister further said that “.. India has not filed claim for extension of its continental shelf so far..” Their entire procedure and documentation as per the UN guidelines was handled by their ministry of science and technology, together with their national institute of Oceanography. My research did not reveal any diplomatic response by India to this statement.

Pakistan's assertion at that time was however proved incorrect, because India also filed it's claim in 2009. However it would be interesting to look at the dates : India (11 May 2009) and this was the 4th last in the list of submissions, (Trinidad and Tobago (12 May 2009) Namibia (12 May 2009) Cuba (1 June 2009)) and just 2 days before the deadline. Obviously nations who considered their maritime benefits and potential, as strategic and critical, did this paper work much early. And in this activity of key national importance, we scored lower than most. Sad to see the last minute-ism and this reflection of the lack of urgency and seriousness of protection of Indian interests, in the eyes of the world. Would anyone help know who were the key politicos and administrators of Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Defence, our delegates/ diplomats to the UN and UNCLOS ? Who was in-charge of the UNCLOS representation for extending the EEZ at that time?

A rare news item in Indian media, before the submission deadline quoted an official saying "a full submission means that India cannot make additional claims later. Another thing is that no major disputes have been settled so far on existing claims. That means the important features will be defined technically in case of dispute." This indicates that a partial submission was a distinct possibility. And that leaves an open question whether the government filed in final claims, which closes the option of any revision, or submitted partial claims leaving space for additions or deletions at a later stage ?

Once the claims were submitted to the UN body, it should have taken another three to four months before India is called to defend its claims before a sub-group. So what is the status of our claim, and any disputes so far ?

The baseline against which this distance into the sea is measured has been established conventionally at the low waterline. But as is standard practice, where the coastline is rugged and there are islands, making it difficult to establish a low-tide mark, one may take a straight base line. Wonder what was the methodology adopted by India especially in the zones which coincide with our neighbors ?

Bangladesh has already notified its baseline, which is disputed by both India and Myanmar. It measured its baseline from a distance of 10 fathoms from the shore, arguing that its coastline is unstable.

With Sri Lanka, the short distance of less than 24 nautical miles means that a separate statement of understanding may have to be signed between the two countries. India had been talking to Sri Lanka on this, but does anyone know the status, or if any agreement had been reached ?

Except for Pakistan and Bangladesh, India has boundary agreements with all the other neighbours - but even these will have to be revised in light of the extension of the continental shelf limits. Then, there is the long-standing dispute with Pakistan over Sir Creek .

As can be inferred above, the entire EEZ extension issue is not very clear to the nation, creates more confusion. And this is the reflection of the muddled state of India's maritime diplomacy. However, there are certain actions/ policy suggestions that may be useful.

1.Status update/ statement regarding the current position of our EEZ extension, and a relevant notification, to let the citizens know how far out to the sea we can venture safely, and assured of protection by the nation. It is worth reminding everyone about the high level of citizen confidence, and on it's part, governmental/ diplomatic sensitivity about their citizen safety globally, that has been so well demonstrated by US, UK etc. The drive of some of these nations regarding their foreign policies is worth emulating.

2.India should issue relevant maritime maps and also demarcate conflict/ ambiguous areas with an advisory to avoid them. This would save to an extent a lot of heartburn when fishermen and various sea faring vessels get caught in this politics on either side and have to languish in jail. The so called secrecy, and unavailability of such navigation data is a misnomer in this age, when GPS systems are available a plenty.
3.Once the EEZ extension is established, the wider maritime boundary would afford us a safety zone, and a hot-persuit zone to protect our borders, even before enemy/ enemy artefacts touch the shore. The Mumbai attacks have demonstrated the need to take the manning and monitoring of this protection zone much more carefully. The same investigation revealed the possibility of an exchange (of disruptive men and materials) between foreign vessels and local boats, on the high seas. Thus establishing a search and persuit zone would give us legal cover internationally and diplomatically.

4.To help protect the maritime border, government should make boat registration compulsory, along with a GPS system that's constantly ON when on sea, with a black-box kind of data protection mechanism. Boat registration will give data, monitoring and control. GPS systems will also serve the same purpose, along with location, search and rescue advantages in case of any accident, mishap, or storms. And if Indian government, together with ministries of defence and home cannot provide a decent GPS service, for the purpose then it is shameful. We can make use of our satellites, and technology exists to scale up the tracking and monitoring operations to cover many hundred's of thousands of such GPS devices mounted on sea faring vessels/boats.

5.Our maritime border security can be further enhanced by insisting on a temporary registration/ permission (similar to a VISA), an advance manifest of men and materials, and switching ON (or a redirection of, to Indian system) of the GPS on all foreign ships, which propose to enter Indian EEZ.

6.We have home grown technical expertise to remotely locate, monitor, eves-drop, jam/ disable unauthorized wireless, which should be deployed across the EEZ to enforce Indian GPS locking, in case defaulters (read mischief makers) switch off Indian and are ON a foreign GPS service. Such deployment, possibly expensive, should definitely be on during any crisis like the Mumbai attacks in 2008.

7.On the diplomatic front, we should try to engage with our neighbors in resolving EEZ issues, and extend the above described security umbrella. A good way to move ahead could be to share the common EEZ areas, and TOGETHER via bilateral ties extend the reach of EEZ out to high seas especially the South West, South, and Eastern maritime borders. Thus, we can have joint exploration of EEZ wealth and mutual agreement in any exploitation of common areas pending a dispute resolution, sharing the cost and benefits too – like mineral royalties. India with it's superior maritime and scientific manpower, can in this way develop some allies, remove the third party troublemakers, and help the neighbors and itself too. And IF the neighbors are willing, together one can develop a much more extended economic zone cover like covering the entire Bay of Bengal, with some concessions given to neighbor's in the form of unilateral hand of help of sharing the research data of the disputed area, bolstering common defences, scientific development and joint explorations, etc in return to help control the integrity and security of those waters from unwanted third party excursions into this territory. This would help develop scientific, business collaboration, and help develop a wider 'joint security zone' for all concerned. Thus rather than fighting each other, everyone would benefit by joint exploitation of an area much larger than envisaged individually as a single nation. Thus together high seas could also be monitored, and this would help widen the safety zone for the nation against any other powers. Such agreements would be easy to reach out with Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh, and Myanmar.

I am sure the readers and experts would be able to come up with some good suggestions, and possibly open the eyes of the Indian establishment about strengthening the maritime diplomacy.

1 comment:

Would like to know reader opinions and feedback for improvement